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American foreign policy, as well as a
cautionary tale on the dangers of trying
to achieve preeminence overseas at the
cost of undermining security at home.
The American Way of Strategy could
also inform today’s emerging maritime
strategy, for which its characterization
of the benefits of various grand strate-
gies has value.
F. G. HOFFMAN
Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities
Quantico, Virginia
Kagan, Frederick. Finding the Target: The Trans-
formation of American Military Policy. New York:
Encounter Books, 2006. 432pp. $29.95
How has American military strategic
thought evolved since the fall of Saigon?
How did each service reinvent itself,
shake off old ghosts, and restore morale
and purpose? How did each decide
upon a different doctrine to guide its
training, procurement, and deploy-
ment? How much influence do civilian
defense officials wield over strategy and
doctrine? Is the country well served by
the process that produces strategy and
doctrine inside the services? Military
historian Fred Kagan provides here a
tremendous primer on these issues. He
has written a clear, definitive, and opin-
ionated history of the development of
strategy and doctrine in the American
military since 1975. His clarity of prose
and the evenhandedness of his presen-
tation enable the reader to separate the
history from Kagan’s interpretation.
That is the mark of a fine scholar.
Kagan is well known among military
historians. A serious researcher and au-
thor of a major work on the Napoleonic
wars, his greatest strength is his down-
to-earth, friendly, inquisitive style. As
the resident military scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute, Kagan
has the venue and cachet to draw am-
bassadors and four-star generals rou-
tinely to his conferences, where they
join captains and majors fresh from the
battlefield. Building upon his years as a
professor at West Point, Kagan has de-
veloped a broad network of military
contacts that makes this book a blend
of scholarship and insider knowledge.
Though he is plugged into the daily
skirmishes of Washington’s political
arena, as a historian Kagan’s chief inter-
est lies not in the immediate issues but
in focusing upon the underlying trends.
The author blends brief synopses of
such past campaigns as Bosnia, DESERT
STORM, and IRAQI FREEDOM with por-
traits of strategic iconoclasts like John
Boyd, John Warden, Douglas MacGregor,
and Arthur Cebrowski, emphasizing
how doctrine changed and with what
results related to budgets and force
structure. Kagan does not believe that
force structure evolves slowly over the
decades. Instead, he illustrates how the
few influence the many, and how strate-
gic leadership affects the direction of
each service for good or ill.
On the positive side, Kagan recounts
how in 1978 the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, Admiral Thomas Hayward, came
to believe that the downward spiral in
the naval budget was the result of an in-
tuitive strategy held by Secretary of De-
fense Harold Brown and his senior
staff. These civilian defense leaders were
concerned that the Soviet Union was
increasing its geopolitical pressure
across Europe, gaining both economic
and political advantage in the shadow
of its presumed superiority in land
forces. Accordingly, the Office of the
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Secretary of Defense was focused on
building up Army and Air Force strength
in Western Europe, while naval forces
languished because they were seen as of
lesser utility. Hayward set out to chal-
lenge this strategic vision by commis-
sioning and then championing a naval
force-planning study called “Sea Plan
2000.” The essence of this plan was the
assertion that any assault across the
inner-German border would result in a
global war. Naval forces provided strike
capabilities that could be marshaled
anywhere, while protecting the sea-
lanes. The redoubtable head of the Soviet
navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, had
enunciated a strategy of protecting his
ballistic missile submarines in their
northern bastions. Sea Plan 2000 advo-
cated naval-based offensive strikes
against the Kola Peninsula and against
Soviet attack and missile submarines
worldwide.
When President Ronald Reagan took
office in 1981, John Lehman became
secretary of the Navy and aggressively
supported such an offensive maritime
strategy. The U.S. Navy budget in-
creased, and the Soviets worried. Their
self-confidence was dented, as they later
freely admitted. No one could predict
what would occur in an actual war, but
according to Kagan, “Hayward’s real-
ization that the Navy’s greatest weak-
ness was its strategic thinking made
possible a transformation of the Navy’s
capabilities with few new technologies.
As a result, the Navy regained a consid-
erable degree of balance against a wan-
ing Soviet threat.”
Conversely, Kagan cites the efforts of
former secretary of defense Donald
Rumsfeld to “transform” the services as
flawed in both concept and process. He
criticizes the recent focus on information
technologies, with the attendant as-
sumption that fewer forces will be
needed as a consequence. Further, he
questions whether the process of trans-
formation is really advanced by grafting
an “Office of Force Transformation”
(since abolished) onto the Department
of Defense, arguing that the services
were in fact taking full advantage of in-
formation technologies for a decade be-
fore a “revolution in military affairs”
was decreed.
On balance, Kagan gives the services
good marks for their stewardship over
the past twenty-five years as the na-
tion’s guardians. The current war in
Iraq, however, worries him, because the
military did not adapt swiftly enough.
He is too good a scholar to make
sweeping assertions about American
martial superiority. Instead, he argues
that the process of adapting in order to
win is the nation’s greatest strength.
Finding the Target will make an excel-
lent textbook for those whose opera-
tional jobs have not left sufficient time
to keep abreast of the changing strategic
perspective in the services.
F. J. “BING” WEST
Newport, Rhode Island
Goldstein, Lyle J. Preventive Attack and Weapons
of Mass Destruction: A Comparative Analysis.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006.
268pp. $50
Do nuclear weapons represent a source
of stability in world politics, or does the
acquisition of these weapons create in-
centives for established nuclear states or
longtime rivals to destroy nascent nu-
clear weapons programs before they ac-
tually coalesce into significant strategic
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